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CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS IN CALIFORNIA:
NEW PROBLEMS IN FITTING PUNISHMENT
TO CRIMES
Let rules be fix'd that may our rage contain,
And punish faults with a proportion'd pain;
And do not flay him, who deserves alone
A whipping for the fault that he has done.
Horace'
Cruel or unusual punishments are proscribed by a California Con-
stitution provision which is similar to the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.2  California's provision first ap-
peared in the "Declaration of Rights," which was part of the 1849
Constitution.3 The provision was re-incorporated into the Consti-
tution of 1879, and has since remained unchanged.
4
1. Boox or FAInLiAR QUOTATIONS 179 (Ottenheimer Publishers, Inc.
1970).
2. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines be imposed;
nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted." CAL. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 6. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments imosed." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The
differences between the conjunctive form (U.S.) and the disjunctive form
(California) are analyzed in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 634-37, 493
P.2d 880, 883-86, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155-58 (1972), and Mosk, The Eighth
Amendment Rediscovered, 1 LOYOLA (L.A.) L. REV. 4, 17-19 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Mosk].
3. See generally People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 634-35, 493 P.2d 880,
883-84, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155-56 (1972).
4. Article I, section 6 was limited, however, by the passage of Proposi-
tion 17, in 1972, which added section 27 to article I of the Constitution. Sec-
March 1975 Vol. 12 No. 2
California's cruel or unusual punishment prohibition was pat-
terned from the eighth amendment. The eighth amendment was
itself modeled after the English Declaration of Rights of 1688.5
The principle behind the prohibition had developed as early as the
eleventh century in the laws of Edward the Confessor. A similar
provision can be found in the Magna Carta, and was embodied in
the laws of several colonies prior to its adoption in the Bill of
Rights.6
The eighth amendment was originally interpreted to prohibit only
manifestly cruel punishment such as drawing and quartering.
7
Weems v. United States was the Supreme Court's first major
breakthrough into the concept of excessiveness as a possible stan-
dard for the eighth amendment. Weems held that the eighth
amendment applied to prohibit those punishments which were
grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. "[P]unishment
for crime," held Justice McKenna, "should be graduated and pro-
portioned to [the] offense."9 The Weems principle of dispropor-
tionality has been used in subsequent eighth amendment litigation 0
as well as in many state cruelty cases.1
Although a few cases had alluded to such a criterion,12 In re
Lynch 3 was the first California case to expressly apply dispropor-
tion 27 declares that the death penalty may not be held to constitute cruel
or unusual punishment under article I, section 6.
5. 1 W. & M. c. 2 at 143; see In re Kemnmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890).
6. See generally Mosk, supra note 2, at 6-7; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 316-21 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
7. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-82 (1910); Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878); In 'e Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890):
"[Ilf the punishment... [was] burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking
on the wheel, or the like, it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge
such penalties to be within the constitutional prohibition." (Justice Fuller
was speaking of the New York constitutional provision, but applying its
meaning to the eighth amendment as well).
8. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
9. Id. at 367.
10. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279-80 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973).
11. E.g., State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788 (1952); State v. Pratt,
36 Wis. 2d 312, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967). For a compilation of other states
see Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335, 363-64 (1970).
Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court has called Weems "[t[he
most significant advance toward elimination of brutality in penal adminis-
tration .... " Mosk, supra note 2, at 10.
12. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 646, 493 P.2d 880, 892, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 164 (1972); People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 423-28, 326 P.2d 457,
481-84 (1958) (dissenting opinion); People v. Oppenheimer, 156 Cal. 733,
737, 106 P. 74, 77 (1909); In re Finley, 1 Cal. App. 198, 202, 81 P. 1041, 1042
(1905).
13. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
[VOL. 12:359, 1975 Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVW
tionality grounds to a statutory penalty.14 Recently, two California
courts of appeal have attempted to apply the cruelty standards laid
down in Lynch to the punishment proscribed in a criminal assault
statute.15 People v. Romo'6 and People v. Wingo17 came to opposite
conclusions as to whether the punishment was cruel or unusual.
The conflict will be resolved by the Supreme Court of California
when it reviews the two cases.'" This comment will discuss the
status of California's cruel or unusual punishment provision, and
will analyze the important problems raised by Romo and Wingo.
DETERMNG DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CALiFoRNIA
The Three-Step Approach
John Lynch was approached by a waitress while he was sitting
in his car in a drive-in restaurant. As the waitress neared the
window,
[S]he saw the fly of his pants open, his hand on his erect penis, and
a "pin-up" magazine open on the front seat next to him. When
petitioner heard her... he turned, saw her, and said "Oops."19
The waitress left immediately, but later called the police when she
observed through Lynch's rearview mirror that he was "still ex-
posed."
Lynch was found guilty of indecent exposure,20 and because this
was his second conviction21 he was sentenced under California's in-
determinate sentencing law to not less than one year in prison.
22
14. Id. at 420, 503 P.2d at 927, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 223; See generally Com-
ment, In re Lynch and Beyond to Judicial Review of Sentences, 10 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 793 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Lynch and Beyond]; Com-
ment, California's Cruelty Criteria: Evaluating Sentences After In re
Lynch, 25 HAST. L.J. 636 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Cruelty Criteria].
15. CAL. PINAL CODE § 245 (a) (West 1972): "Every person who commits
an assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument
or by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury is punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison for six months to life ....
16. 39 Cal. App. 3d 326, 114 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1st Dist. 1974).
17. 38 Cal. App. 3d 895, 113 Cal. Rptr. 695 (2d Dist. 1974).
18. On August 7, 1974, the California Supreme Court decided to review
Romo and Wingo, and thereby determine the constitutional status of the
penalty provision of Penal Code section 245(a).
19. 8 Cal. 3d at 438, 503 P.2d at 940, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 1972).
21. Lynch's first conviction was nine years prior to the second.
22. For complete summaries of these facts, and discussions analyzing the
opinion, see Lynch and Beyond and Cruelty Criteria, supra note 14; see
His habeas corpus application came after he had served more than
five years of his term.
Holding that a sentence of "not less than one year" is a life sen-
tence for purposes of a cruelty examination, the supreme court ad-
vanced a three-pronged approach to the cruelty question. The first
prong involved an examination of the nature of the offense and
the offender, with reference to the degree of danger presented to
society. Second, the disputed punishment was compared to punish-
ments in California for more serious crimes. Finally the disputed
California punishment was compared to punishments in other states
for similar offenses.
Applying these tests to Lynch's life sentence, the supreme court
held that the sentence was "so disproportionate to the crime for
which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends funda-
mental notions of human dignity."23
The Lynch method was also used by the court, in the case of
In re Foss,24 to determine if a minimum sentence was violative of
California's cruelty provision. With a prior conviction fourteen
years earlier for possession of heroin, Foss was convicted of sell-
ing and furnishing heroin.2 5 This prior conviction resulted in the
imposition of the sentence of ten years to life, without possibility
of parole for ten years. Foss challenged only that part of the
sentence which denied him parole. Using the Lynch criteria, the
supreme court held that the provision of the statute precluding
parole for a minimum term was in violation of the cruel or unusual
punishment prohibition of the California Constitution.20
Underlying Considerations
Foss is currently the only case in which the California Supreme
Court has used the three-pronged test developed in Lynch to deter-
mine whether or not a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel.
2 7
also The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972, 61 CAL. L. REv. 273, 418-26
(1973) [hereinafter cited as California Supreme Court).
23. 8 Cal. 3d at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
24. 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
25. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 11501, Stats. 1959, c. 1112, p. 3193, § 4 (re-
pealed 1972), now CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 11352 (West Supp. 1974).
26. 10 Cal. 3d at 929, 519 P.2d 1085, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
27. People v. Schueren, 10 Cal. 3d 553, 516 P.2d 833, 111 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1973), involved special circumstances of an "unusual" punishment, but
without the use of the Lynch method. Schueren was convicted of a lesser
included offense, which carried a sentence greater than that of the offense
originally charged. The supreme court found that an accused is not nor-
mally subject to an increased maximum term as a result of "exercising his
constitutional rights and successfully defending against the crime charged."
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There were two basic concerns underlying the Lynch and Foss de-
cisions. First, the supreme court was concerned with whether the
indeterminate sentencing procedure would fail to work in the cir-
cumstances presented. Furthermore, the court was interested in
whether there was some legitimate governmental purpose in the
punishment.
California's indeterminate sentencing system is founded on the
theory that once a person is rehabilitated his sentence should be
shortened. In other words,
[T]he purpose of the indeterminate sentence law, like other modem
laws in relation to the administration of the criminal law, is to mit-
igate the punishment which would otherwise be imposed upon the
offender. These laws place emphasis upon the reformation of the
offender.. . . They endeavor to put before the prisoner great incen-
tive to well-doing in order that his will to do well should be
strengthened and confirmed by the habit of well-doing.28
As originally used in Europe, the indeterminate sentencing sys-
tem was to perform the function of lengthening the sentence of
a prisoner who was not rehabilitated at the end of his term. This
approach was not adopted in the United States. Instead, the system
was used to shorten sentences "as an incentive to reformation.
'29
Under the American approach, the length of sentence is based
on the needs of the individual offender, with reference to the inter-
est of society in the offender's condition.30 The system is used as
a device to "relate the length of confinement to the problem to be
solved."3 1 California follows this American viewpoint.
The indeterminate sentencing procedure in California commences
when the sentencing judge decides to imprison the offender rather
than impose a sentence of probation, or suspend the sentence alto-
10 Cal. 3d at 560, 516 P.2d at 838, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (emphasis by the
court). The court held that such a punishment was "unusual," and there-
fore a violation of the California Constitution. The sentence was modified
accordingly.
28. In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 692, 171 P. 958, 959 (1918), quoted in part
in In re Lynch, 8 Cal 3d at 416, 503 P.2d at 924, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (em-
phasis by the court).
29. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 416, 503 P.2d 921, 924, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217,
220 (1972).
30. Prettyman, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Right to Treatment,
11 Amv. Csnv. LAw REv. 7, 16 (1972).
31. Conrad, Punishment to Fit Criminals, in JusTIcE, PuNismv=I,
TRFTivNT 4 (L. Orland ed. 1973).
gether.32 A judge may not impose a specific term of years.33  He
may simply state the sentence as 'the term prescribed by law.13 4
After a sentence of imprisonment is imposed by the judge, the
Adult Authority is given control over the length of sentence, 5 lim-
ited only by the boundaries set in the statute under which the de-
fendant was convicted.3 6
Theoretically, once the offender is within the control of the Adult
Authority he is released only when it has been determined that
society will not be endangered by his liberation. Indeed, the release
of a rehabilitated individual into society is one of the basic purposes
of an indeterminate sentencing system.
87
The bases of the indeterminate sentencing system are rehabili-
tative treatment of the offender, incentive to reform, and release
at the completion of rehabilitation. The supreme court is concerned,
in cruel or unusual punishment cases, with the absence of one of
these bases, and the failure of the system in the individual case.
Concerned about the failure of the system to work, the court in
Lynch discussed the possibilities of adequate treatment for a sexual
exhibitionist. Noting the intimidation and "concerted peer scorn"
to which the exhibitionist is subject, as well as the apparent insuf-
ficiency of adequate treatment, the court concluded:
In any event, if this is the most optimistic treatment offered for
exhibitionism in the most psychiatrically oriented institution in the
Department of Corrections, the long prison sentence imposed by
section 314 can hardly be justified as an act of benevolence towards
the offender.38
In re Foss also presented circumstances where the goals of the
indeterminate sentencing system could not be fulfilled. How can
the offender have an incentive to reform himself in circumstances
where release is precluded for a period of at least ten years? The
bulk of Foss' rehabilitation dealt with his drug addiction. The court
concluded that,
32. See generally Lynch and Beyond, supra note 14; Comment, The Adult
Authority-Administrative Sentencing and the Parole Decision as a Prob-
lem in Administrative Discretion, 5 U.C.D. L. Rzv. 360 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Sentencing].
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West 1972).
34. Sentencing, supra note 32, at 363.
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3020 (West 1972): "[T]he Adult Authority may
determine and redetermine, after the actual commencement of imprison-
ment, what length of time, if any, such person shall be imprisoned ....
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3023 (West 1972).
37. See Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, in JusTIcE, PwU=HmEwT,
TRTmnrNT 6, at 8 (L. Orland ed. 1973). Another purpose of such a system
suggested by the author is the prevention of great differences in sentencing
caused by "unregulated vagaries of individual judges." Id.
38. 8 Cal. 3d at 434, 503 P.2d at 937, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
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[O]nce he has been able to overcome that addiction or show a real
promise of rehabilitation and of being able to remain free of further
narcotic usage he may not be tried under parole supervision but
must still remain in prison until the expiration of the mandatory
ten-year period. This hardly serves as an impetus towards "well-
doing" on the part of the prisoner.8 9
Thus, the goal of incentive to reform by strengthening the offend-
er's will and fitting punishment to the criminal were frustrated by
the lack of any possibility of parole.
40
Another concern underlying both the Lynch and Foss decisions
was whether there was a legitimate governmental purpose in the
punishments prescribed. 41 If the ideals of the indeterminate sen-
tencing model cannot work for a specific offense, is there some other
legitimate purpose for the invocation of the lengthy sentence?
Punishment is usually justified on the basis of one or more of
four traditional theories. These theories are retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.42 In Lynch, the extremely
severe penalty of a possible life sentence, imposed because of the
petitioner's recidivism, could not be justified under any of these
traditional theories. Rehabilitation could not justify a life sentence
because of the inadequacy of the treatment for exhibitionists avail-
able in prisons.43 Nor would a deterrence theory justify a life sen-
tence for indecent exposure. First, the offender in Lynch had
39. 10 Cal. 3d at 924, 519 P.2d at 1081, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
40. Id. at 923-24, 519 P.2d at 1081-82, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 657-58.
41. It has been contended that such an inquiry does not address cruel
or unusual punishment provisions; instead, it addresses substantive due
process questions. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HAnv.
L. REV. 1071 (1964). Packer suggests that the issue posed by cruelty provi-
sions is not whether there is a rational basis for the legislature's actions,
but more correctly, whether the legislature's actions-rationality aside-are
"too offensive to stomach." Id. at 1076. "Decency" is the issue in eighth
amendment-type claims; "rationality" in due process claims. Id.
Whether a discussion of legitimate governmental purposes is appropriate
in an Eighth Amendment case is a question well beyond the scope of this
comment. Suffice it to say that the concept does seem broad enough to
have a valid role in the rationale for almost any inquiry into the constitu-
tionality of a criminal penalty.
42. See generally Packer, The Justification for Punishment, in JusTIcE,
PuNismvENT, TREATvNT 183 (L. Orland ed. 1973); THEoRiES or PuNISH-
ivnzT (S. Grupp ed. 1971); PmosoprmcAL PE srEc~rvrs ON PuNism~ENT
(G. Ezorsky ed. 1972); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT JR, HANDBOOK ON Cmaw-
ixAL LAW § 5 (1972).
43. 8 Cal. 3d at 433-34 503 P.2d at 937, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
psychological problems which significantly contributed to causing
his offense. He was not likely to ever contemplate the possible
criminal results of his acts. Furthermore, even if exhibitionism
could be deterred, the sentence needed to accomplish the deterrence
must surely be less than life imprisonment. A life sentence would
be well beyond the needs of a deterrent purpose of punishment.
Similarly, a life sentence was unnecessary to incapacitate the of-
fender who exposed himself in public only once every nine years.
Since the exhibitionist does not commonly progress to more serious
crimes,4 4 to incapacitate him for life for being a two-time offender
is cruelly excessive. Finally, even if retribution is a valid rationale
for punishment under modern considerations, 4 5 the gravity of the
offense in the case of an exhibitionist could not rationally justify
a life sentence.46 Consequently, although the supreme court did
not specifically hold in Lynch that the lack of any legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose was a contributing factor in its decison, this fac-
tor was of at least an underlying concern to the court.
47
The court which decided In re Foss was similarly concerned with
the lack of a penological purpose to punishment. 48 Rehabilitation
fails in a mandatory ten-year term for possession of a limited
amount of drugs because of the removal of any incentive for re-
habilitation.4 9 Isolation from society is not a legitimate reason for
denying the possibility of parole for a fixed term since society's
safety is already protected by the power of the Adult Authority
to deny parole if the offender has not been rehabilitated. There-
fore, the minimum term could not "afford any extra protection from
a dangerous offender to society than is otherwise available .... ,,50
Nor was deterrence of sufficient importance to justify the pre-
clusion-of-parole provision in Foss. Because Foss sold heroin only
to support his addiction, his crimes of possession and sale of the
drug were closely related to physiological and psychological com-
44. See Id. at 433, 503 P.2d at 936, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
45. Retribution may not be the sole purpose of punishment according to
People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 651, 493 P.2d 880, 896, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152,
168 (1972).
46. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 429, 503 P.2d 921, 933, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217,
229 (1972).
47. This position is supported by language in a subsequent case: "Al-
though not mentioned in Lynch, also relevant [to an examination of the
nature of the offense and the offender] is a consideration of the penological
purposes of the prescribed punishment." In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 919-20,
519 P.2d 1073, 1078, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 654 (1974).
48. Id. at 923-25, 519 P.2d at 1081-82, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 657-58.
49. See text accompanying notes 36-37, supra.
50. 10 Cal. 3d at 925, 519 P.2d 1082, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 658 (emphasis
added).
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pulsions. The possibility of the minimum sentence having a deter-
rent effect in the case was slight.5 1
Therefore, future challenges based on California's cruelty pro-
vision must go beyond Lynch's three-step approach to the issue
of disproportionality. They must resolve the issue of whether the
indeterminate sentencing method will succeed, and if it will not,
they must determine whether there is some other legitimate
penological purpose to the punishment. These determinations are
factors in analyzing the nature of the offense and the offender-
the first step in a Lynch examination.
THE Wingo An Romo CASES
Wingo
Two recent California Court of Appeal cases, which are currently
before the supreme court, present the court with the opportunity
to elucidate the Lynch-Foss cruelty standard.
In April of 1974, People v. Wingo52 was decided by the Second
District Court of Appeal. The defendant had been charged with
murder 53 and assault by means of a force likely to produce great
bodily injury.5 4 Although acquitted on the murder count, the de-
fendant was convicted on the assault charge and was sentenced to
prison for six months to life.
Charges in the case stemmed from the brutal beating and death 55
of a seventy-two year old man. The defendant had knocked the
victim down, and kicked him in the upper body and head. The
51. Foss was followed by a divided court of appeal in People v. Malloy,
- Cal. App. 3d -, 116 Cal. Rptr. 592 (4th Dist. 1974), where the defendant
was convicted for selling LSD, and was precluded from parole consideration
for a five year minimum period. Deterence could have been achieved in
this case since the defendant was a commercial dealer. He was not an ad-
dict, and was not under a physiological compulsion. Since there was a
valid penological purpose to the punishment, the court's holding of uncon-
stitutionality appears wrong unless the preclusion-of-parole provision is ex-
cessive per se for deterent purposes in drug offenses.
52. 38 Cal. App. 3d 895, 113 Cal. Rptr. 695 (2d Dist. 1974).
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1972).
54. Id. § 245 (a) (quoted at note 15).
55. Death was caused by a heart attack. An acquittal on the murder
charge occurred in large part because witnesses for the prosecution could
not say whether the heart attack would have occurred regardless of the in-
juries sustained in the beating.
beating occured during daylight when the victim had been walking
through a public park. On appeal, the defendant's theory was that
the sentence, with its life maximum, was unconstitutionally dispro-
portionate to the crime of assault with force likely to produce great
bodily injury.
The first Lynch test was resolved in favor of the long sentence.
The court of appeal examined the nature of the offense and the
offender with reference to the degree of danger presented to society.
The court found that the crime charged and the offender himself
presented a "serious challenge to public order."50  Not only was
the attack unprovoked, but there were no mitigating circumstances.
Therefore, there was a high degree of danger to society.
The court came to the same result when it compared the sentence
for assault with the punishments for more serious crimes in Cal-
ifornia. There are many crimes which are arguably more serious
than the assault charged in Wingo, and some of these offenses in-
volve a less severe punishment. But the court found that there
was no "gross and indefensible miscalculation"57 in the legislature's
assignment of penalties. Forcible assault likely to produce great
bodily injury was found to be a crime warranting major punish-
ment. The differences between this and other crimes of a similar
nature were found to be insignificant.
A comparison of California's punishment with those in other
states for similar offenses, the third Lynch test, revealed that there
were several jurisdictions which had less severe punishments.
Those differences were not sufficiently significant, however, to sup-
port a finding that California's punishment is so inconsistent with
general American standards that it is cruel or unusual. In fact,
the court of appeal found that the assault charge in Wingo is "con-
sidered nationally a most serious crime,"5 8 thereby rendering Calif-
ornia's punishment compatible with those of other jurisdictions.
The court concluded, based on its application of the Lynch
criteria, that a life sentence for an assault likely to produce great
bodily injury does not violate the cruel or unusual punishment pro-
vision of the California Constitution.
Romo
Two months after the Wingo decision, the First District Court
of Appeal, in People v. Romo, 59 held that the same penalty provision
56. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 898, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
57. Id. at 898-99, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
58. Id. at 899-900, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
59. 39 Cal. App. 3d 326, 114 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1st Dist. 1974). This decision
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is cruel and unusual under the Lynch approach.
Billy Romo and three friends had been drinking heavily when
a fight broke out between Romo and Rodriguez. Rodriguez, who
was stabbed in the leg and back, testified at trial that he saw a knife
in Romo's hand. Romo testified that Rodriguez had the knife and
had tried to "stick" Romo, when they both fell to the ground.
Although he testified that he grabbed at the knife, Romo testified
further that he had not intentionally stabbed Rodriguez.6 0 Romo
was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon.61
The defendant challenged the maximum penalty of life imprison-
ment as cruel or unusual. Like its resolution in Wingo, the first
Lynch test was resolved in favor of the long sentence. The court
stated,
There can be little doubt that the crime of assault with a deadly
weapon is a serious offense and that by reason of the violence of
the conduct inherent in the crime the offense and the offender pre-
sent a danger to society. Accordingly, from this viewpoint it may
not be said that there is an unconstitutional disproportionality
between the offense and the penalty prescribed therefor by sub-
division (a) of section 245.62
Comparing the punishment with those of more serious crimes,
the court observed that there were fifteen Penal Code sections and
one Vehicle Code section, all of which established crimes "Which
[were] undeniably of far greater seriousness than the crime of as-
sault with a deadly weapon,"68 but which provide for penalties
much less than life. Among the crimes listed were manslaughter, 64
kidnapping,65 shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied build-
ing,66 and statutory rape.
67
was upon a rehearing by the court of appeal. At the first hearing on the
matter the court of appeal held that there was no violation of the California
Constitution. Although Lynch was cited in the first opinion, a three-step
approach was not used, nor was there any in-depth analysis of Romo's chal-
lenge.
60. The circumstances surrounding the offense were mentioned in the
first opinion, but not at all in the second.
61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (a) (West 1972) (quoted at note 15).
62. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 337, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 297 (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. CAL. PENAL CODE § 193 (West 1972) (up to fifteen years).
65. Id. § 208 (one to twenty-five years).
66. Id. § 246 (one to five years in prison or up to one year in county
jail).
67. Id. § 264 (up to fifty years in prison or up to one year in county
jai).
Finally, turning to the comparison of California's punishment
with those in other jurisdictions, the court of appeal noted that ex-
cept for one state, no other American jurisdiction "approaches the
life maximum decreed in California. 68
Having found that the punishment for assault with a deadly
weapon was at "total disparity" with other more serious crimes,
and that the California punishment was not consistent with other
jurisdictions, the court of appeal concluded that the punishment
was a violation of California's constitutional cruelty provision.
ISSUES PRESENTED TO THE SUPREIVi COURT
The California Supreme Court has been presented with a serious
conflict between two court of appeal decisions. This conflict stems
from uncertainties in, or perhaps misapplications of, the Lynch ap-
proach to the question of cruel or unusual punishment. In both
Wingo and Romo, the supreme court will have to deal with pro-
blems in the Lynch approach which these cases have raised.00 It
68. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 338, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
69. One problem, not dealt with at length here, is whether or not a court
has the power to declare a statutory punishment provision cruel or unusual
as applied only in the particular case. There is a split of authority on the
issue, with the majority of jurisdictions adhering to the position that the
statute itself must be attacked, rather than its application to a single of-
fender. E.g., McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St. 2d 68, 203 N.E.2d 334 (1964);
Chasse v. People, 119 Colo. 160, 201 P.2d 378 (1948); for a compilation of
cases following this view, see Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335, 359-63 (1970). Cali-
fornia's position in the conflict is uncertain, although cases appear to favor
the majority rule. See generally Cruelty Criteria, supra note 14, at 645-
48.
In re Lynch has been criticized because it evaluated the recidivist portion
of the indecent exposure statute in terms of the least offensive behavior
covered by that law. E.g., California Supreme Court, supra note 22, at 422.
Since the defendant's behavior in that case was found to warrant a less
severe punishment than that provided in the statute, the entire recidivist
punishment provision was declared unconstitutional. 8 Cal. 3d at 439, 503
P.2d at 940, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
The legislature, on the other hand, fixes punishment limits thinking of
"the worst cases in the class that it is dealing with." Wechsler, Sentencing
Innovotions, Sentencing Institute: Violence Today-A Judicial Concern, 46
F.R.D. 497, 519 (1968). In re Lynch invalidated the punishment provision
not only as applied to the individual in that case, but also as applied to
offenders who cannot be reformed and who would have served the maxi-
mum sentence. This result was not necessary, because the court could have
held that under the circumstances presented in Lynch, and only in that case,
the punishment was unconstitutional.
A ruling by the supreme court that the judiciary has the power to declare
individual applications of a punishment cruel or unusual would make the
Lynch result more acceptable. Romo and Wingo, however, do not present
the court with a clear opportunity to rule on the issue. The assaults
charged in those cases were punishable by imprisonment in the county jail,
[voL. 12:359, 1975 Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
can be assumed that the court will retain at least the basic frame-
work of its three-step approach to cruelty. In order to make that
approach more workable at lower appellate levels, however, the
court should hand down specific guidelines.
What is a "More Serious" Crime?
One problem the supreme court must deal with in its upcoming
Romo-Wingo decisions concerns the second Lynch technique, that
of comparing the challenged penalty with punishments prescribed
for more serious offenses in California. The rationale in Lynch for
this test was that occasionally the legislature acts in response to
a temporary public outcry. The reaction of the legislature on that
occasion would result in an excessive penalty. Since a majority
of punishments are acted upon with "due and deliberate regard for
constitutional restraints, °7 0 those punishments are used as guides
to the parameters of "permissible degrees of severity.
'7 1
The difficulty in comparing penalties is in determining whether
one offense is more "serious" than another. As a general rule it
could be said that those offenses with greater penalties are more
serious than those with lighter penalties. But in examining a pen-
alty as excessive or disproportionate, the use of such an argument
would be resorting to circular reasoning. The greater penalty is
important, however, because it gives an indication of how serious
the legislature thinks the offense is.7
2
The supreme court has required that the crimes chosen for com-
or by a fine, as well as by incarceration in a state prison. If the particular
cases warranted less than a state prison term, the remedy should be a find-
ing of abuse of discretion at the trial level, rather than a finding of cruel
or unusual punishment. In these cases, a less severe punishment could have
been applied by the trial judge. For a discussion of judicial review of trial
judges' sentence impositions, see Lynch and Beyond, supra note 14, at 794-
800.
70. 8 Cal. 3d at 426, 503 P.2d at 932, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
71. Id. The comparative approach was substantially rejected in Howard
v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903). See generally Cruelty Criteria, supra note
14, at 640 and 643-44.
72. "The legislature is . . . accorded the broadest discretion possible in
enacting penal statutes and in specifying punishment for crime . . . " In
re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 414, 503 P.2d 921, 923, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 219 (1972),
quoting from People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 640, 493 P.2d 880, 888, 100
Cal. Rptr. 152, 160 (1972).
parison be "undeniably of far greater seriousness"73 than the cha.-
lenged offense. Unless there is a considerable difference, the jud-
iciary does not have sufficient means to distinguish and contrast
the seriousness of the various offenses.7 4
One way to differentiate between the gravity of offenses is to
categorize them as violent or nonviolent. Violence has been defined
in several ways, with most definitions emphasizing an unwarranted
or abusive degree of force.73
Although the former is usually equated with the latter, there is
a distinction between the violent offender and the dangerous of-
fender.76 Most violent crimes against people involve an offender
and a victim who knew each other, and the crime itself is usually
spontaneous.7 7 Thus, "many, if in fact the majority [of violent of-
fenders], may well not be of a continuing danger [to society].".78
Simply stated, a person can commit a violent crime without necess-
arily being dangerous in the future.
The courts should recognize that when the legislature determines
the penalty for certain conduct it is concerned not only with vio-
lence, but with dangerousness to society-a reflection of "society's
right and power to protect itself.17 9 Dangerousness is a potential
to commit violent crimes, rather than a history of crime commis-
sion. s0 It is caused by psychological characteristics which can now
be recognized, diagnosed, and often very effectively treated.sl High
maximum sentence provisions are reflections of legislative concern
over the dangerousness of the offender.82 Therefore, when a court
determines the seriousness of a crime, for purposes of an examina-
tion into the constitutionality of punishment, the focus should be
on whether or not the commission of the crime discloses a potential
73. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 431, 503 P.2d 921, 935, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217,
231 (1972).
74. California Supreme Court, supra note 22, at 423.
75. E.g., BLAcK's LAw DicToNARY 1742 (revised 4th ed. 1968); Couzens,
Reflections on the Study of Violence, 5 LAw AND SocITY REV. 583, 586
(1971).
76. Sheppard, The Violent Offender: Let's Examine the Taboo, 35 FED.
PROBATION 12, 15 (Dec. 1971).
77. Id. at 13-14.
78. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). But see Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can
Violence Be Predicted?, 18 CnRiE Am DIaQuEucY 393, 394 (1972).
79. Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dan-
gerousness, 18 Cmn=I AND DELINQUENCY 371, 374 (1972).
80. Id. at 372.
81. Id. at 392.
82. See generally Ginsberg & Kockers, The "Dangerous Offender" and
Legislative Reform, 10 WnL rrT L.J. 167 (1974); Sentencing Institute:
Violence Today-A Judicial Concern, 49 F.R.D. 497 (1968).
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for dangerousness. The importance of violence in a cruelty examin-
ation should be limited.
Judicial determinations of seriousness are further confused when
the target crime itself is violent, or poses a threat of dangerousness.
These crimes must be compared to other violent crimes, but the
other crimes must be of undeniably greater seriousness. It is dif-
ficult, for example, to determine whether kidnapping is more ser-
ious than arson. The difficulty stems from the fact that both of-
fenses are violent, and both crimes evidence the offender's potential
for dangerousness.
It has been asserted that the more serious crimes "touch the very
foundations of social order. 83 Traditionally, these crimes were
burglary, arson, rape, robbery, mayhem, and murder. Theft would
be considered less serious because it is not an offense which "threat-
ens the underpinnings of the social order."8 4 Of least seriousness
are such offenses as assault resulting in no injury, and minor bat-
teries. This type of categorization of seriousness had been proposed
by several writers.
85
Most categorization of crimes has been aimed at the legislative
level. At the judicial level a more common-sense approach must
be used because,
Courts are without adequate facilities for the re-examination of the
complex social and economic phenomena of which the legislature
is supposed to have taken cognizance, and it is not likely that they
will be furnished with [these facilities] .... 86
A common-sense approach is feasible since it is made up of broad,
general judgments of "relative moral iniquity and harmfulness.'8
These categories, however, "cannot cope with any precise assess-
ment of an individual's wickedness."
88
Another problem with the categorization of crimes is the place-
ment of offenses arising from civil disobedience. Burning draft
records, for example, is not only a challenge to the law and an ex-
83. E. FRLON, STANDARDS oF AM cAN LEGISLATION 57 (1965).
84. Wechsler, supra note 69, at 524-25.
85. E.g., Wechsler, supra note 69, at 524; MOD. SENTMCING AcT, art. III
(2d ed. 1972).
86. E. FRtEmD, supra note 83, at 96.
87. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in THEOReS OF
PuNismvm= 354, 375 (Grupp. ed. 1971).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
pressive crime, but it is also, arguably, a threat to public order.
But is it a "serious" offense? This type of problem will continue
to plague the courts so long as they must categorize the "serious-
ness" of crimes.
The lack of any clear definitions or categorizations of seriousness
gives rise to the need for undeniable differences in "seriousness"
between the challenged offense and the crime used for comparison.
The necessity for supreme court guidance in the area of compar-
ing offenses is clear. People v. Romo,89 for example, compared
assault with a deadly weapon to crimes which, by the court's stan-
dards, were "undeniably of far greater seriousness." 90 One of these
crimes was statutory rape. But is an eighteen-year-old boy who
has sexual intercourse with his seventeen-year-old girlfriend un-
deniably more dangerous to society than someone who assaults an-
other with a deadly weapon?91 In short, the use of "more serious"
crimes for comparison purposes was inconsistent with the Romo
court's stated standard of comparison.
An interesting approach to the determination of seriousness of
offenses was used in People v. Wingo.92 Wingo also involved the
charge of assault, but in searching for more serious crimes the court
conceded that "reasonable men may and do differ sharply on the
relative degrees of evil and social danger attached to particular
crimes."9s  Judicial interference in the assignment of degrees of
danger should come only in cases of "gross and indefensible miscal-
culation."94 The Wingo court simply observed that forcible assault
is a major crime, and that a major punishment is approriate.
Wingo may have touched on a viable alternative to the Lynch
technique of comparing punishments in terms of seriousness. It
89. 39 Cal. App. 3d 326, 114 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1st Dist. 1974).
90. Id. at 337, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 297. The crimes were: manslaughter;
assault with intent to commit murder; kidnapping; mayhem; assault with
intent to commit rape, sodomy, mayhem, robbery or grand larceny; as-
sault with caustic chemicals with intent to injure or disfigure; assault on
a peace officer or fireman engaged in the performance of his duties; arson;
burglary by torch or explosives; wrecking a vehicle of a common carrier
causing bodily harm; shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied build-
ing; poisoning food or drink with the intent to injure a human being; drunk
driving causing bodily injury; forcible abduction for purposes of prostitu-
tion; and statutory rape. Id. at 337-38, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
91. Another example of the court's inconsistency was its use of drunk
driving causing injury as an offense of greater seriousness than the assault
charged. It cannot be rationally asserted that an injury caused by an intox-
icated driver is "undeniably of far greater seriousness" than an injury
caused by an assault with a deadly weapon.
92. 38 Cal. App. 3d 895, 113 Cal. Rptr. 695 (2d Dist. 1974).
93. Id. at 898, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
94. Id. at 899, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
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is a combination of the categorization and common-sense ap-
proaches. For major crimes, a severe punishment is appropriate. For
minor offenses, a less severe punishment is sufficient. If the offense
is minor as a matter of logic, experience, and common sense, yet the
punishment is severe, then there is a strong indication of dispro-
portionality. Under the same criteria, if the offense is major and
the punishment is severe, then the courts would not need to dis-
tinguish between minute categories of seriousness. Two all-encom-
passing categories would be sufficient for judicial purposes.
Balancing the Three Tests
Another problem which the supreme court must deal with is
whether or not any one of the three Lynch tests outweighs the
other two. Succinctly stated, how should the three tests be bal-
anced to reach a final conclusion in a cruelty examination? It must
be remembered that the criterion for California's cruelty prohibi-
tion is whether the disproportionality is so great that it "shocks
the conscience and offends fundamental standards of human dig-
nity."95 The three-step Lynch approach is an aid to the application
of this standard.
Since the three Lynch steps are merely means to an end, any
strict mathematical formula should be avoided in balancing the
tests. The inquiry should focus on a combination of all three tests,
with a reasonable degree of flexibility.
In Romo, two tests favored disproportionality, while only one
favored a finding of constitutionality. According to the First
District Court of Appeal, the danger to society was clear. The pun-
ishment was declared unconstitutionally disproportionate, however,
solely on the basis of the two comparative tests. This application
of the Lynch criteria was erroneous.
The degree of danger which the offense and the offender present
to society, the first Lynch test, should be given the most consider-
ation in any cruelty challenge. Most cases in which disproportion-
ality has been found to exist have involved nonviolent or relatively
nondangerous offenders.96 When the offense is one in which the
95. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 424, 503 P.2d 921, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217,
226 (1972); In re Foss, 10 Cal 3d 910, 919, 519 P.2d 1073, 1078, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 649, 654 (1974).
96. E.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (falsifying public
safety of society is threatened, comparative techniques should only
be allowed to outweigh that threat if there are irrational or irrec-
oncilable differences between the punishments. Lynch itself used
the comparison tests only to bolster a tentative finding of dispro-
portionality.97 People v. Anderson,8 which struck down capital
punishment in California, used a comparative approach after having
already found capital punishment to be a violation of the consti-
tutional cruelty prohibition."0 Foss, like Lynch, used the compar-
ative approach simply to strengthen its prior finding of excessive-
ness.100
Romo is one of only two California cases finding disproportion-
ality solely on the basis of the comparative techniques.1' 1 These
results are unacceptable because the weight to be given the compar-
ative factors in the balancing of the tests should be severely limited
when the offender's dangerousness to society is clear.
The fault lies in a complete lack of any supreme court guidelines
for balancing the tests. In Lynch, all three tests pointed to dis-
proportionality. This is the best approach, since a requirement of
agreement of all three tests would be consistent with the acknowl-
edged limitation that a court will invalidate a punishment only
when it is "plainly and palpably" in conflict with the constitu-
tion..0 2  The supreme court should require that a finding of un-
constitutional disproportionality must be supported by all three of
the Lynch criteria.
document); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973) (perjury); Faulk-
ner v. State, 445 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1968) (passing bad checks); In re Lynch,
8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (indecent exposure);
In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (sale
of drugs); People v. Lorentzen, 187 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972) (sale
of marijuana); accord, O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (dissent-
ing opinion) (punishment for sale of liquor in dry state urged as dispropor-
tionate); In re Jones, 35 Cal. App. 3d 531, 542, 110 Cal. Rptr. 765, 772 (1973)
(dissenting opinion) (punishment for sale of marijuana urged as dispropor-
tionate).
97. 8 Cal. 3d at 431, 503 P.2d at 935, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
98. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
99. Id. at 651 and 654-56, 493 P.2d at 895 and 898-99, 100 Cal. Rptr. at
167 and 170-71.
100. 10 Cal. 3d at 923 and 925-29, 519 P.2d at 1081 and 1082-85, 112 Cal.
Rptr. at 657 and 658-61.
101. The other case is People v. Thomas, - Cal. App. 3d -, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 393 (4th Dist. 1974), which also dealt with assault with a deadly
weapon, and came to the same conclusion as Romo, that the punishment
was cruel and unusual.
102. In re Finley, 1 Cal. App. 198, 200, 81 P. 1041, 1042 (1905); accord,
In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969) (un-
constitutionality must appear clearly, positively, and unmistakenly).
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CONCLUSION
When the California Supreme Court decides the Romo and Wingo
cases, it will have to deal either explicitly or implicitly with two
serious problems: (1) the criteria for determining "seriousness" of
crimes, and (2) the weight to give each of the factors in the three-
pronged Lynch approach.
Underlying the Romo and Wingo cases-and therefore underlying
the determination of the two problems presented-will be a -concern
with whether the indeterminate sentencing procedure will be suc-
cessful in those specific cases, and whether the punishment serves
a legitimate penal purpose.
The question of what constitutes seriousness is best resolved by
either classifying all crimes into major and minor crimes, or by al-
together abandoning the use of comparisons between different
types of crimes. Court of appeal applications of the Lynch compari-
son approach have clearly demonstrated the confusion stemming
from the current lack of any workable standard.
The "balancing" problem should be resolved by a holding that
before a punishment will be declared unconstitutionally dispropor-
tionate, all three prongs of the Lynch method must be resolved
against the punishment. This result would be consistent with the
judiciary's valid reluctance to declare a law unconstitutional.
The Lynch approach to cruelty examinations is an acceptable ex-
ercise of the judiciary's powers of constitutional review. But the
need for clarification in that approach is clear. Cases like Romo and
Wingo should be used by the supreme court to explain the criteria
for detrmining the constitutionality of punishments, thereby avoid-
ing future problems on the lower appellate levels.
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